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IN THE SHADOW OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: 
“OUTSOURCING” THE INVESTIGATION BY 
GOVERNMENT COUNSEL TO RELATOR COUNSEL 
DURING THE SEAL PERIOD 
ROBERT FABRIKANT† AND NKECHINYEM NWABUZOR†† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The civil False Claims Act (FCA)1 was enacted during the Civil War to 
combat fraudulent sales and other abusive practices by private suppliers to 
the Union Army.  From the outset, the FCA permitted actions to be brought 
either by the attorney general, or a private citizen acting on behalf of the 
United States.2  Where a private citizen files a claim under the FCA, it is 
termed a qui tam lawsuit.3 
In its current form, the FCA requires a private citizen, also known as 
the relator, to file an FCA complaint under seal.  Most activity in qui tam 
cases takes place while the case is under seal, yet there has been little 
scholarly review of the practices which predominate while the complaint is 
under seal.  This short comment addresses only several of the important, 
and troublesome, practices which have taken root since Congress enacted 
the 1986 amendments to the FCA, which created the seal period mecha-
nism.  As demonstrated below, collusive activity by government and qui 
tam counsel have subverted the purposes for which Congress created the 
seal period.  Immediate action by Congress and the courts is necessary to 
prevent the seal period from continuing to be used as a sword, not a shield, 
by government and qui tam counsel. 
 
 †Mr. Fabrikant is a senior counsel in the Washington, D.C., office of Sidley Austin LLP, and 
an Adjunct Professor at Howard University School of Law. 
 ††Ms. Nwazbuzor is a 2004 graduate of Howard University School of Law and a practicing 
lawyer in Washington, D.C. 
 Many of the practices discussed here are not documented in scholarly or other sources, but 
are based on Mr. Fabrikant’s more than twenty-five years of defending qui tam cases. 
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2003). 
2. Id. § 3730 (a) & (b). 
3. Qui tam is a term of art that originates from the Latin phrase “‘qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur’ which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the 
King’s behalf as well as his own.’”  Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 7403 
n.2 (2007).  Qui tam actions are actions brought on behalf of the government by a private party, 
who receives some part of the recovery awarded as compensation for his efforts.  United States ex 
rel. Fender v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1229 (N.D. Ala. 2000). 
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II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Under the FCA, whistleblowers may file a qui tam complaint under 
seal alleging that the government has been defrauded by a government 
contractor.4  The complaint remains under seal for sixty days (“the seal 
period”), during which the government is to determine whether the suit 
warrants the government intervening in the action and taking over the suit.5  
The government may extend the seal period only by obtaining an order 
from a district court judge upon a showing of “good cause.”6 
The pertinent legislative history makes crystal clear that the purpose in 
providing for a seal period was two-fold: first, to maximize the govern-
ment’s ability to investigate the allegations in the complaint by keeping 
from public view the allegations in the complaint;7 and second, to avoid 
compromising a pending criminal investigation.8  It is common knowledge, 
however, that government counsel often use the seal period for the purpose 
of leveraging a settlement, rather than determining whether to intervene in 
the lawsuit.  It is also common knowledge that government counsel rou-
tinely permit, indeed invite, whistleblower’s counsel to do much of the gov-
ernment’s investigative work during the seal period.9  The latter practice 
may fairly be described as a form of “outsourcing.” 
This article argues that government counsel’s increasing, and mis-
placed, reliance on relator’s counsel during the seal period has the reprehen-
sible effect of sapping the government’s ability to meet their professional 
responsibility of evaluating the allegations in the complaint in a “fair and 
even handed” manner.10  It also argues that “outsourcing” is exacerbated by 
attempts by whistleblower’s counsel to be compensated for their work on 
behalf of government counsel under the attorneys’ fees provision of the 
FCA.  Finally, the cumulative effect of these abusive practices is to unduly 
prolong the seal period, and to enhance the ability of the government and 
 
4. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) (2003). 
5. Id. § 3730(b)(2). 
6. Id. § 3730(b)(3) (2003). 
7. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289. 
8. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5281. 
9. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1323, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
10. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, to all 
United States Attorneys et. al, Re: Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health 
Matters, June 3, 1998, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/readingroom/chcm.htm (setting out 
the manner in which government attorneys are to enforce the FCA in civil health care matters).  
This directive was issued in response to concerns that DOJ had acted in an abusive, heavy handed 
manner in the healthcare area in applying the FCA.  This resulted in the GAO report which 
appears in the following footnote. 
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relator’s counsel, often acting in consort, to extract unreasonable settle-
ments from defendants.11 
III. ABUSIVE PRACTICES BY GOVERNMENT AND QUI TAM 
COUNSEL DURING THE SEAL PERIOD 
A. EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE SEAL PERIOD 
The government intervenes in approximately one third of all FCA 
cases.12  It is almost always the case that the sixty-day seal period provided 
in the FCA is extended, usually by an extraordinarily lengthy amount.  
There are no available statistics which show the average/median length of 
the seal period.  The only systematic review which pertains to the issues at 
hand was conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 
2005.  The GAO concluded, after reviewing data maintained by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) for the period 1986 to 2005, that “cases in 
which DOJ intervened took a median of 38 months to conclude and ranged 
from 4 months to 187 months.”13  This figure does not include cases in 
which the government did not intervene.  Nevertheless, it provides a relia-
ble indication of the length of the seal period in cases where the underlying 
allegations (or other matters which were brought to the government’s atten-
tion during the seal period) are sufficiently meritorious to warrant interven-
tion by the government.14 
If the median seal period is, indeed, thirty-eight months, then the 
median exceeds the statutorily contemplated period of two months, by a 
factor of eighteen.  This reflects cases in which the government has inter-
vened over a period of nearly twenty years.  Given the protracted period 
during which this extravagant ballooning of the seal period has occurred, it 
 
11. The Government Accounting Office issued a report in 1999 lamenting abusive practices 
by the United States Department of Justice in using the FCA to coerce settlements.  U.S. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-170, MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: DOJ’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE IN NATIONAL INITIATIVES VARIES 4-5 
(1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
12. Id. at 29. 
13. Letter from Laurie E. Elkstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, to U.S. 
Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner and Rep. Chris Cannon, and Sen. Charles E. Grassley (Jan. 31, 
2006) [hereinafter GAO Letter]. 
14. Id. (emphasis added).  The GAO report indicates that cases in which the government 
intervened, settled for amounts which significantly exceeded those cases in which the government 
declined to intervene.  GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 35.  The GAO report indicates that in the 
538 cases in which the government intervened from 1987 through 2005 the median settlement 
recovery was $1,200,000, whereas the median settlement recovery in non-intervened cases was 
$100,000, or less than ten percent of the median settlement in the intervened cases.  Id.  This 
confirms the obvious point that cases in which the government intervenes are more substantial 
than the non-intervened cases.  Id. 
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is fair, indeed long overdue, to ask why it has occurred, and what actually 
happens during the seal period? 
There is a plethora of data on the amounts of the financial settlements 
which occur at the termination of the seal period,15 and somewhat less data 
on the length of the seal period.  Yet, there is surprisingly little or no data 
on what actually happens during the seal period.  In particular, there are 
very few reported cases describing, or challenging, what transpires during 
the seal period.  Reported decisions which discuss what occurs during the 
seal period do so usually in the context of deciding whether the relator’s 
assistance to the government, especially in the form of work done by rela-
tor’s counsel, entitles the relator to a greater share of the amount recovered 
from the defendant by the government. 
Strangely, these court discussions do not occur in the context of de-
ciding whether to award attorneys’ fees and expenses for relator’s counsel’s 
assistance during the seal period.  As noted below, relator’s counsel seek to 
use their rendering assistance to the government as a factor which entitles 
their client to a larger share of the government’s recovery, and to argue that 
their clients are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for that very same 
assistance.  We are aware of no case in which this “double-dipping” has 
been challenged. 
B. ABUSIVE PRACTICES 
Prior to 1986, the FCA limited relators to receiving not more than the 
percent of the proceeds recovered in the event the government intervened in 
the suit.16  As part of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, however, Congress 
increased the cap in cases in which the government intervened from ten 
percent to thirty percent.17  The statute provides little insight on how the 
relator’s share is to be determined other than to say that it “depend[s] upon 
the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution 
of the action.”18  The DOJ has prepared a Relators Share Guidelines 
 
15. For example, the GAO reported, “[F]rom fiscal years 1987 through 2005, settlement and 
judgments for the federal government in FCA cases have exceeded $15 billion, of which $9.6 
billion, or 64 percent, was for cases filed by whistle blowers under [the] FCA’s qui tam 
provisions.”  GAO Letter, supra note 13, at 1. 
16. This cap was inserted in the 1943 amendments to the FCA.  31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1982).  
Under the 1943 amendments the relator could recover up to twenty-five percent if the government 
failed to intervene. 
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). 
18. The legislative history of the Senate bill identifies three factors that ought to bear on the 
percentage awarded to the relator: first, the significance of the information provided by the relator 
to the government; second, the relator’s contribution to the result; and third, whether the 
government was previously aware of the information initially provided by the relator the 
government.  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 28 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5293. 
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(Guidelines), which sets forth a number of factors which it takes into 
account in deciding how large the relator’s share of the proceeds should 
be.19 
These Guidelines have several provisions which bear on the issues at 
hand.  First, the Guidelines mention “[t]he relator provided substantial as-
sistance during the investigation and pre-trial phase of the case;”20 second, 
the “relator’s counsel provided substantial assistance to the government”;21 
and third, the “relator and his counsel supported and cooperated with the 
government during the entire proceeding.”22 
A case in point is United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health 
Group, Inc.,23 where the court awarded the relator twenty-four percent of 
the government’s recovery.24  In Alderson, the court noted that during the 
seal period relator’s counsel 
predicted [to relator] that DOJ would demand that [relator’s 
counsel], on behalf of [the relator] assume primary responsibility 
for prosecution of the litigation. . . . [and] further predicted that, 
absent [relator’s counsel] assuming the burden of lead plaintiff’s 
counsel, the United States would decline to intervene.25 
The court further noted that at a pre-intervention meeting, at which the 
government lawyers 
reiterated their skeptical view of [relator’s case] . . . as anticipated 
by [relator’s] counsel, DOJ claimed a scarcity of resources to 
undertake protracted litigation against [the defendant].  DOJ 
sought and received assurance from [relator’s] counsel of their 
ability and willingness to commit the necessary resources to the 
case and to undertake the principal role in prosecuting the 
litigation . . . [subsequently] pursuant to . . . and in reliance on the 
commitment from [relator’s counsel] the United States 
intervened.26 
 
19. These Guidelines became available through a Freedom of Information Act request, and 
have now become public.  See generally 11 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 17-19 
(1997). 
20. Dep’t of Justice, Relator’s Share Guidelines 2 (Dec. 1996) (internal memorandum), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/frauds/fcrs/fraudnet/topics/relator’s_share__intervened 
.htm (follow Relator’s Share Guidelines hyperlink under DOJ Memoranda). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001). 
24. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. 
25. Id. at 1328. 
26. Id. at 1329. 
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The court further commented that “much of the work surrounding 
the preparation of the United States’ [superseding complaint by 
way of intervention] reveals significant cooperation between the 
parties.  For example, auditors’ reports were appended as exhibits 
to the United States’ complaints . . . [during this process,] the 
parties undertook the arduous task of identifying and highlighting, 
page by page, individual categories of information contained in the 
[cost reports which relator contended contained false statements], 
individual categories of information contained in the reports.  This 
task was managed principally by [one of relator’s counsel] who 
directed a team of DOJ paralegals.”27 
The extraordinary assistance to the government provided by relator’s 
counsel during the seal period was a significant factor in awarding relator a 
share of the proceeds at the upper range of the statutorily permissible 
amount.  Alderson did not, however, address the extent to which, if at all, 
that very same assistance by relator’s counsel, which counted toward an up-
ward share for the relator, could also be recovered under the attorneys’ fees 
provision of the statute.  Thus, the court had no occasion to determine 
whether it would be a prohibited form of “double dipping” to permit coun-
sel’s conduct to count both in calculating the relator’s percentage share and 
also in setting the proper amount for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. 
The case of United States ex rel. John Doe I v. Pennsylvania Blue 
Shield, Xact Medicare Services, Inc.28 is the only reported case which 
remotely comes close to addressing “outsourcing.”  In that case, defendants 
sought to reduce relator’s attorneys’ fee award on the ground that a portion 
of counsel’s hours were redundant, and therefore unnecessary, because they 
duplicated time spent by government counsel and their investigators.29  The 
court held that it could not reduce the award unless the defendant could, 
with specificity, identify the hours which duplicated the government’s 
investigatory efforts.30  The court did not address the situation where the 
government lays back during the seal period and allows the relator (and 
relator’s counsel) to do the government’s investigative work.31 
 
27. Id. at 1330. 
28. 54 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 1999). 
29. Pa. Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d. at 414-15. 
30. Id. 
31. The case has been criticized on the ground that “it is clearly improper, and it could 
require significant, intrusive discovery into the government investigation.”  JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL 
FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 4-244 (3d ed. 2006).  This may be so, but it does not 
address the more important question whether non-redundant work should be recompensed if it was 
work that the legislative history would suggest should be performed by the government, not the 
relator, during the seal period. 
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The Alderson court’s discussion of the character and quantity of the 
assistance rendered to the government during the seal period by relator’s 
counsel mirrors our own experience in this area.  This assistance consists 
broadly of the following: 
First, during the seal period, relator’s counsel, at the request of the 
government, conducts factual and legal research, drafts and reviews govern-
ment letters to defense counsel, drafts and reviews internal government 
position papers, drafts and reviews government mediation briefs and pres-
entations, participates in interviewing fact witnesses, and, unbeknownst to 
the defense, takes over responsibility for paying and preparing the govern-
ment’s expert witnesses, supplying paralegals and other clerical help to the 
government, and reviewing documents produced by defendants (including 
documents produced under compulsion).  It is sometimes the case that when 
the relator takes over contractual responsibility for the expert witness, the 
relator enters into a new contract with the expert which calls for the expert 
to be reimbursed at a significantly higher amount than called for under the 
government’s contract, and the new contract often contains a contingency 
feature which did not appear in the government’s contract, and which gives 
the expert an impermissible stake in the outcome of the case. 
Second, during the seal period, at the request of government counsel, 
relator’s counsel conducts settlement negotiations with defense counsel.  
These negotiations involve relator’s counsel proposing a settlement dollar 
amount to defendants, and the government not only participating with 
relator’s counsel in developing what is ostensibly the relator’s settlement 
position, but government counsel explicitly endorsing the settlement 
offer(s) made by relator’s counsel. 
Third, during the seal period, government counsel either makes sub-
stantial settlement offers to the defense and/or “recommends” to the defen-
dant that it accept a settlement offer from the relator which calls for a 
substantial payment by the defendant.  The government prolongs the seal 
period, and may conduct additional factual and/or legal research while 
settlement negotiations are being conducted with the defendant. 
As all of the above unfolds, relator’s counsel often acts, and sees them-
selves as acting, as “general counsel” to the government.  In fact, a highly 
regarded relator’s counsel has publicly stated that relator’s counsel should 




32. Mark Raspanti, Current Practices, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 36, 41 (1998). 
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IV. THE ABUSIVE PRACTICES, AKA “OUTSOURCING,” ARE 
CONTRARY TO THE FCA 
All, or virtually all, of the practices set out above contravene Con-
gress’s two purposes in creating the seal period mechanism: first, to enable 
the government to investigate the allegations in the relator’s complaint in 
order to determine whether the case warrants government intervention; and 
second, to avoid compromising an ongoing criminal investigation (should 
one, in fact, exist). While the foregoing, abusive,  practices may constitute 
“substantial assistance” to the government, and therefore may enable the 
relator to obtain an increased share of the proceeds from the suit, the relator 
should not be recompensed separately for these practices during the seal 
period. 
A relator’s recompense for assistance provided by its counsel to the 
government is to obtain from the government (and the court) an increase in 
its fractional share of the ultimate settlement proceeds.  If relators were able 
to recover both a higher percentage of the settlement proceeds for assisting 
the government and the costs incurred in performing legal and investigative 
work on behalf of the government, relators effectively would be awarded a 
double recovery.  The FCA does not countenance such a windfall for 
relators for work done by relator’s counsel during the seal period. 
It is arguable that the FCA does contemplate a double recovery for 
work done by relator’s counsel before and after, but not during, the seal 
period.  Prior to the seal period, relator’s counsel has no choice but to ex-
pend energy preparing and filing the complaint.  After the seal period, if the 
government declines to intervene or intervenes sans settlement, relator’s 
counsel may have to undertake substantial litigation activities.  Such work 
by relator’s counsel is entirely conventional, and wholly within the ambit of 
the FCA.  This cannot be said, however, about work by relator’s counsel 
during the seal period. 
The legislative history makes clear that the seal period was created for 
the benefit of the government, not relators.33  Specifically, the seal period 
was created “in response to Justice Department concerns that qui tam 
complaints filed in open court [as was the case prior to the 1986 amend-
ments] might tip off targets of ongoing criminal investigations.”34  “Under 
this provision, the purposes of qui tam actions are balanced with law 
enforcement needs. . . .”35 
 
33. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 9263. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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The legislative history also makes clear that the onus is on the 
government, not the relator, during the seal period.  Thus, the Senate Report 
states: 
Keeping the qui tam complaint under seal for the initial 60-day 
period is intended to allow the Government an adequate oppor-
tunity to fully evaluate the private enforcement suit and determine 
both if that suit involves matters the Government is already 
investigating and whether it is in the Government’s interest to 
intervene and take over the civil action.36 
The Report later mentions that creating the sixty-day seal period 
furnishes the “Government an opportunity to study and evaluate the infor-
mation” provided by the relator.37  As a prominent relator lawyer correctly 
put it: “During the period while the complaint remains under seal, the 
government is obligated to investigate the allegations and determine 
whether to intervene in the action.”38 
“Outsourcing” of the type outlined above, does not simply restore the 
status quo as it existed before Congress imposed the mechanism of the 
“seal period.”  Rather, “outsourcing” actually puts the relator in a better 
position than before the 1986 Amendments.  Prior to the 1986 Amend-
ments, a relator filed a complaint and the lawsuit proceeded like any other 
suit.  By virtue of “outsourcing” a relator can now hide behind the “seal” 
and conduct one-sided discovery against defendants.  Thus, through this 
improper collaboration, the government and the relator have converted the 
seal period primarily for the benefit of relator, and, in so doing, have sub-
verted the purposes for which Congress created the seal period.  “Out-
sourcing” enables the relator to use the seal period as a sword rather than a 
shield. 
The FCA does not contemplate that the relator and the government 
may maintain the seal for an indefinite period while one or both of them 
investigate and the government makes its intervention decision.  Rather, the 
 
36. Id. at 5289 (emphasis added).  According to the leading treatise in the field, the “primary 
purpose [for mandating that the complaint be filed initially under seal when it passed the 1986 
Amendments] was to allow the government to ascertain privately ‘whether it was already 
investigating the claims stated in the suit and then to consider whether it wished to intervene.’”  
BOESE, supra note 31, at 4-159 (quoting from Erickson ex rel. United States v. Am. Inst. of 
Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986)); 
United States ex rel. Piiolon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1995)).  See, e.g., 
United States ex rel. Made in the U.S.A Found v. Billington, 985 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1997) 
(finding the purpose of requiring a relator to file a written disclosure statement along with sealed 
complaint is to enable government to properly investigate claims prior to deciding whether to 
intervene). 
37. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5289 (emphasis added). 
38. Raspanti, supra note 32, at 38. 
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statute provides that the sixty-day seal period may be extended, but only for 
“good cause.”39  Congress believed that “with the vast majority of cases, 60 
days, is an adequate amount of time to permit Government coordination, 
review and decision.”40  “Consequently, ‘good cause’ would not be estab-
lished merely upon a showing that the Government was overburdened and 
had not had a chance to address the complaint.”41  The committee’s strong 
desire that the government toe the line during the seal period was 
dramatically underscored by their statement that it “does not intend that 
criminal investigations be considered an automatic bar to proceeding with a 
civil fraud suit.”42 
When the 1986 Amendments were enacted, the DOJ attorneys in civil 
FCA cases “rel[ied] in large part on FBI reports and information gathered 
by the various Inspectors General.”43  The government identified two flaws 
in the then existing investigatory scheme: first, that the DOJ attorneys did 
not have compulsory process available to them after a relator filed a suit (at 
that time not under seal) to determine whether to intervene in the relator’s 
suit.  The second defect related to the civil DOJ attorneys being unable to 
obtain information which had been obtained through the grand jury proc-
ess.44  Congress rectified these inadequacies by granting CID authority to 
DOJ during the newly created seal period.  If Congress had intended to 
allow, or encourage, relators to participate in the government’s seal period 
investigation (and supplement the work done by the FBI and the Inspectors 
General, through “outsourcing” or otherwise), surely it would have been 
explicit, as it was explicit in sweetening the incentives for relators to file 
suits under seal.  Instead, Congress expressly limited the use of the 
expanded investigatory tools to the government. 
Congress’s failure to invite or endorse an “outsourcing” approach to 
supplement the government’s seal period investigation is significant for the 
further reason that Congress was then aware that “perhaps the most serious 
problem plaguing effective [FCA] enforcement is a lack of resources on the 
part of Federal enforcement agencies.”45  “Outsourcing,” especially of the 
 
39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2003). 
40. Act of October 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 5289-90 
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(e)). 
41. Id. (emphasis added). 
42. Id. at 5290. 
43. Id. at 5271 (omitting footnote reference to testimony of Associate Deputy Attorney 
General Jay Stephens). 
44. This reflected the holding in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 
(1983), limiting the access of civil government lawyers to information obtained through the grand 
jury process. 
45. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5272 (1986). 
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type that occurred here, is, presumably, a response to a lack of government 
resources, yet Congress, being then painfully aware of the government’s 
reportedly inadequate resources did not invite or endorse “outsourcing.”  It 
is certainly the case that “outsourcing” would have been a quick fix to the 
government’s reported lack of resources, yet Congress moved in a different 
direction.  It provided the government with additional investigatory tools 
which were emphatically not made available to relators.  Congress’s failure 
to enshrine “outsourcing” is noteworthy in view of the fact that it was aware 
that the government’s FCA adversaries were large companies, and that “too 
often” the “government’s enforcement team is overmatched by the legal 
teams major contractors retain.”46 
All of the above makes clear that, during the seal period, it is incum-
bent upon the government to make an intervention decision and for the 
government to conduct the investigation necessary to make that decision.47  
If the government is “overburdened” during the seal period, it is precluded 
from seeking to extend the seal period for that reason.  A fortiori, being 
“overburdened” does not provide the government with a legally sufficient 
justification for “outsourcing” the investigation during the seal period. 
An exceedingly lengthy delay in unsealing the complaint is itself strong 
evidence that the government and the relator abused the seal period.  This is 
especially so if the qui tam complaint did not contain allegations which 
touched on a pending criminal investigation. 
By prolonging the seal period for the purpose of conducting settlement-
related, one-sided discovery, the government and the relator deliberately, 
and wrongly, preclude defendants from exercising their rights as litigants 
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  This violates the spirit of the 
FCA because, as made plain by the legislative history, “by providing for 
sealed complaints, [Congress] did not intend to affect defendants’ rights in 
anyway.”48  Indeed, “the committee feels that sealing the initial private civil 
false claims complaint protects both the Government and the defendant’s 
interests without harming those of the relator.”49 
Courts have made clear that negotiating settlements does not constitute 
“good cause” warranting an extension of the seal period.50  Moreover, 
 
46. Id. at 5273. 
47. Elsewhere the committee referred to the seal period as the “the 60-day evaluatory 
period.”  Id. at 5289. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 
1997) (“[T]he government argues that lifting the seal would interfere with settlement 
negotiations. . . .  Congress enacted the seal provision to facilitate law enforcement, not to provide 
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whenever the government makes a settlement demand, or advises defen-
dants that it has quantified the defendant’s liability to be a six or more 
figure number, this can only mean that the government has, at least infor-
mally, determined, that the case warrants intervention, or at least had ob-
tained the information they believed they needed to evaluate the matter and 
to make a formal intervention decision.  The government’s failure to for-
malize that decision thereafter is inexplicable and not consistent with the 
FCA.  The government may not keep a complaint under seal after its deci-
sion to intervene.51  The government may not “outsource” an investigation 
instead of formalizing an intervention decision after it is in a position to 
know whether the matter warrants intervention. 
Unnecessary and prolonged delays in lifting the seal also impinge upon 
the “public’s interest in monitoring” government activity,52 and deprive a 
defendant of the right to clear her good name as promptly as possible.  It is 
for that reason that the legislative history emphatically states: “The gov-
ernment should not, in any way, be allowed to unnecessarily delay lifting of 
the seal from the civil complaint or processing of the qui tam litigation.”53 
If the government is unable or unwilling to conduct its investigation 
expeditiously, the proper course for relators is to move the court to unseal 
the complaint, not to do the government’s investigative work for it.  That 
was precisely the situation in United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & 
Taylor,54 where a relator prevailed on a motion, over the government’s 
opposition, to unseal the complaint.55 
Even assuming the government may “outsource” a portion of its inves-
tigation, the government remains financially responsible for the entirety of 
the investigation.  A contrary rule would allow the government to shift the 
costs of its investigation to the defendant.  This is contrary to the FCA 
 
an extra bargaining chip in settlement negotiations.”); United States ex rel. Fender v. Tenet 
Healthcare Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1230 (N.D. Ala. 2000). 
 The legislative history of section (b)(3) also indicates that “once the Government has elected 
whether to intervene under paragraph (2), unsealing of the complaint is virtually automatic.  
Indeed, if the United States does intervene in a civil FCA case it may no longer petition the court 
for an extension of time to hold the case under seal.” Id. (citing United States ex rel. McCoy v. 
California Med. Review, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 967, 969, n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1989)) (internal citations 
omitted); see also United States ex rel. Lacorte v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 97-
0942, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, at *1-5 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 1998) (“[T]his court is reluctant 
to grant repeated extensions of time in qui tam actions. . . [T]he statute itself and the 
Congressional Record direct this court to unseal the case once the United States has been given an 
opportunity to consider intervening. . . .”). 
51. McCoy, 715 F. Supp. at 969. 
52. Baker & Taylor, 955 F. Supp. at 1191. 
53. S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290. 
54. 955 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1997). 
55. Baker & Taylor, 955 F. Supp. at 1192. 
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itself, which allows only for certain of relator’s fees, costs and expenses to 
be borne by the defendant.  In these circumstances, the American Rule re-
garding attorneys’ fees should govern, and the attorneys’ fees should not be 
shifted to the defendant. 
A relator may carry on such investigations of a FCA defendant as the 
relator may think appropriate, but not all of the fees, costs and expenses of 
such investigations are recoverable.  The legislative history makes clear that 
prior to the time that the complaint is unsealed, the relator “knowing of 
government fraud [should] bring that information forward.”56  The relator is 
certainly entitled to fees, costs and expenses incurred in “bring[ing] that 
information forward.”57  But, after the relator has brought the “information 
forward,” the FCA clearly imposes the duty to investigate FCA violations 
on the Attorney General.58  The mechanism of the seal period was created 
in the 1986 Amendments to enable the government, not the relator, to con-
duct that investigation.  Though the relator may provide further assistance 
to the government during the seal period, it is difficult to see how the fees, 
costs and expenses of that gratuitous assistance could qualify as having 
been “necessarily incurred.”59 This is also consistent with the principle that 
“relators are under a duty to minimize their expenses.”60 
As one court recently declared: 
[A] relator files a complaint under seal and serves that complaint 
and a disclosure statement on the DOJ.  The Relator is then obli-
gated to remain idle pending resolution of the Government’s in-
vestigation and decision whether to intervene.61  The relator takes 
over only upon the government’s decision not to intervene and the 
court’s lifting of the seal.62 
Congress made clear that an important purpose of the 1986 Amend-
ments was “to provide the Government’s law enforcers with more effective 
tools.”63  No similar statement of attempting to provide relators “with more 
effective tools” is contained in the legislative history.  Indeed, Congress in 
the 1986 Amendments lived up to its promise—it furnished the government 
 
56. S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266. 
57. Id. at 5267. 
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2003). 
59. Id. § 3730(d)(1). 
60. United States ex rel. Abbot-Burdick v. Univ. Med. Assoc., No. 2:96-1676-12, 2002 WL 
34236885, at *23 (S.C. Dist. Ct. May 23, 2002) (citation omitted). 
61. United States ex rel. Sarmont v. Target Corp., No. 02 C 0815, 2003 WL 22389119 at *3 
(N.D. Ill., Oct. 20, 2003) (citing United States ex rel. Khan v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 
01C976, 2002 WL 849801, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2002)) (emphasis added). 
62. Id. at *4. 
63. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5161, 5266. 
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with new investigatory tools, which, importantly, were denied to relators.  
Congress understood that the government and relators do not stand in the 
same shoes with respect to FCA proceedings, a distinction the Supreme 
Court memorialized several years later.64 
The two key investigatory tools which Congress granted to the govern-
ment were creating the sixty-day seal period (with the option of seeking 
extensions of time upon a showing of “good cause”), and authorizing the 
government to use compulsory process during the seal period through the 
issuance of compulsory investigative demands (CIDs).  Significantly, the 
CID provisions enacted by Congress precluded the government from shar-
ing information obtained through the use of CIDs with third parties.  The 
only limited exception was that the Justice Department could share CID 
information with other government agencies but only after a court order 
was obtained.65  Instead of allowing relators to share in the government’s 
new investigatory tools, Congress increased the incentives for relators 
“knowing of Government fraud” to bring forward information in the form 
of complaint filed under seal.  After the relator brings that information for-
ward by filing a complaint under seal, the burden is on the government to 
investigate in order to determine whether to intervene. 
If a relator chooses “to take a more active role in the litigation,” the 
1986 Amendments grant a relator certain rights  previously not available to 
the relator if the government takes over the litigation.66  In particular,  
subsection C(1) provides qui tam plaintiffs “with a more direct role not only 
in keeping abreast of the government’s efforts and protecting  his financial 
stake, but also in acting as a check that the government does not neglect 
evidence, cause unduly (sic) delay or drop the false claims case without 
legitimate reason.”67  Thus the relator has the right to “be served, upon re-
quest,” with copies of all pleadings filed as a well as deposition transcripts, 
additionally, the person who brought the action may formally object to any 
motions to dismiss or proposed settlements between the government and the 
defendant.68 
 
64. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (“As 
a class of plaintiff, qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government.  They are motivated 
primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.”). 
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a) (2003) (providing that CID materials may not be shared even with 
another government agency unless that agency goes through DOJ and obtains a court order).  The 
committee described this as the “single noteworthy difference from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act [of 
1976, 15 U.S.C. Section 1311-1314, the federal statute providing for CID authority to the 
government in the antitrust area].”  S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5299. 
66. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5290. 
67. Id. at 5291. 
68. Id. 
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The 1986 Amendments also permit  the relator to take over the suit if 
the government has not proceeded with “reasonable diligence” within six 
months of intervening in the action.69  The committee stated its belief that, 
reasonable diligence should be evaluated in light of the amount of 
government investigative and prosecutive activity in relation to the 
length of time the government has been aware of the allegations as 
well as the magnitude of the alleged fraud.  Additionally, courts 
should weigh the resources willing to be devoted by both the 
government and the individual who brought the action as well as 
the relative experience and expertise possessed by each party.  
While in most cases the government’s resources will likely appear 
to exceed the qui tam plaintiffs resources, the committee recog-
nizes that the often heavy, sporadic workload of government 
attorneys may create a situation where a qui tam plaintiff is better 
able to conduct the litigation in a timely manner.70 
The upshot is that relator is permitted to stand in the government’s shoes at 
some point after, not before, the seal is lifted, and only after obtaining court 
approval.  The necessary inference is that Congress did not envision “out-
sourcing” prior to the lifting of the seal. 
A likely counterargument is that the “outsourcing” does not result in 
higher fees, costs and expenses than would have resulted if there had been 
no “outsourcing.”  But, even if this were true, it is wrong to focus on 
whether the improper conduct of the government and the relator resulted in 
higher fees, costs and expenses.  The key point is that the collusive conduct 
was violative of the FCA, and the associated fees, costs and expenses are 
simply not recoverable.  A party should not be rewarded for their improper 
conduct.  In any event, under relator’s anticipated theory, an FCA defendant 
would pay more fees, costs and expenses than if the government had not 
“outsourced” because the government and the relator are attempting to shift 
the cost of those items to the defendant, when they should have been borne 
by the government.  Neither the government nor the relator has a blank 
check against an FCA defendant. 
V. WHY ABUSIVE PRACTICES OCCUR 
All that transpires during the seal period occurs under the judicial radar 
screen because extensions of the seal period are procured by ex parte 
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perfunctorily grant government requests.  The government is generally un-
able to move quickly during the seal period because it is unable or unwill-
ing to allocate the necessary resources to do so.  This resource deficit mani-
fests itself quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Government lawyers are paid considerably less and are less willing to 
put in the time necessary to lawyer a case than the lawyers representing 
large corporate defendants.  Moreover, particularly after 9/11, government 
budgetary priorities have taken money away from FCA enforcement and 
steered it to counter-terrorism areas.  For a combination of these reasons, 
government lawyers have increasingly looked to relator’s counsel to assist 
them in conducting  investigations during the seal period.  It is against this 
backdrop that “outsourcing” emerged. 
An important reason that “outsourcing” has not been the subject of a 
judicial challenge is that none of the parties to a qui tam case have a strong 
interest in having the abusive practices brought to a court’s attention.  First, 
as noted above, government counsel welcome assistance from relators and 
their counsel, and have no interest in exposing to judicial review the 
propriety of such assistance.  Moreover, though the government has an 
institutional interest in expediting recoveries in qui tam cases, budgetary 
and other practical constraints tend to cancel out the government’s theoreti-
cal desire to expedite settlements and recover money. 
Second, relator’s have a strong interest in providing virtually unlimited 
assistance to the government during the seal period.  The data conclusively 
demonstrates that the relator is much better off if the government inter-
venes.  As noted above, where the government does not intervene, and the 
relator has to go it alone, the median of settlements in non-intervened cases 
is less than ten percent than in intervened cases.  Thus, the relator’s strategy 
is to provide the government with the maximum amount of assistance as 
possible during the seal period in the hope of convincing the government to 
intervene.  In all but two reported cases, the relator has been willing to 
allow the government to take whatever time it desired in order to conduct 
its seal period investigation.71  From the relator’s standpoint, the key is 
whether the government intervenes, not when the government intervenes 
during the seal period. 
Third, there are several reasons why qui tam defendants are disinclined 
to challenge “outsourcing” or to seek to terminate the seal period.  Defen-
dants are deliberately kept in the dark by government and relator counsel 
regarding the extent to which the government has solicited and is receiving 
 
71. See text accompanying supra note 49. 
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assistance from relator and his counsel.  Thus, qui tam defendants do not 
have sufficient information with which to challenge “outsourcing.” 
Even assuming a qui tam defendant wished to invoke judicial assis-
tance, defendants are often kept in the dark by the government as to where a 
case is pending, and as to the identity of the presiding judge.  Such conduct 
occurs by government counsel in direct contravention of orders issued by 
the presiding judge in granting the government permission to make a defen-
dant aware of the case during the seal period in order to conduct discovery 
and settlement negotiations.  Perhaps most importantly, qui tam defendants, 
as a general rule, perceive that it is not in their interest to expedite closure 
of the seal period.  Closure would likely have the effect of accelerating an 
announcement by the government that it is intervening in the case.  Such an 
announcement, unless coupled with a settlement, would put downward 
pressure on the defendant’s share price, and contribute to an unfavorable 
picture of the defendant in commercial and capital markets. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The federal government has reaped substantial benefits from the 
significant assistance it has received from relator counsel during the seal 
period, but it does not necessarily follow that such assistance is harmonious 
with the FCA and its legislative history.  Moreover, there is much reason 
for thinking that this assistance has had the effect of enabling relator 
counsel to exert excessive influence on their government counterparts.  If 
“outsourcing” is here to stay, it should be because Congress and the courts 
have placed their imprimatur on it, not because it represents a money-
making enterprise for relators, their lawyers, and DOJ. 
 
